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ABSTRACT
tt new method for assessing and interpreting brand loyalty is proposed that should be well
suited for small business managers because it is easy and inexpensive to implement, the
results are easy to interpret, and it offers insights into competiiion that are superior to
alternative approaches. The method is based on a modification ofa brand switching model.
Rather than two brand purchases, the measures of the new model are one brand purchase and
brand preference. The resulting mixed model combines the conceptual advantages of
behavioral and auitudinal approaches to brand loyalty. it matrix of the two measures can be
analyzed in terms of each brand's gravity, or power to convert brand preference into sales,
and focus, which relates to its ability to auract sales Pom preferences for other brands.
Implications are drawn for small business strategy.
INTRODUCTION
To a large extent, the success of most small businesses depends on their ability to create and
maintain customer loyalty. In the first place, selling to brand loyal'ustomers is far less
costly than converting new customers (Reichheld, 1996; Rosenberg tk Czepiel 1983). In
addition, brand loyalty provides firms with tremendous competitive weapons. Brand loyal
consumers are less price sensitive (Krishnamurthi gz Raj, 1991). A strong consumer franchise
gives manufacturers leverage with retailers (Aaker 1991). And, loyalty reduces the sensitivity
of consumers to marketplace offerings, which gives the firm time to respond to competitive
moves (Aaker, 1991). In general, brand loyalty is a reflection of brand equity, which for
many businesses is the largest single asset. Brand equity reflects the value added (or
subtracted) to a product that results from brand knowledge —for example, the value added to a
cola drink, when the drinker knows it is Coca Cola. Brand loyal consumers who purchase
Coke time afler time illustrate the brand's high equity. Arguably, for small businesses, with
relatively fewer resources, a loyal customer franchise is the most important source of
competitive advantage. For retailers, who, of course, sell many brands, the concept of brand
loyalty may apply specifically to the store's brand if there is one; but, it can also generalizes
to store loyalty. Thus, retailers with high store loyalty enjoy similar competitive advantages,
including less price sensitivity and leverage relative to suppliers.
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Despite the importance of brand loyalty, many small business managers may give it
insufficient consideration because the typical measures are expensive, cumbersome, and
difficult to communicate or understand. This paper presents a simple operationalization of
brand loyalty, based on measures of brand preference and previous purchase. The two
measures can be taken in a single data collection. The results can be interpreted directly from
the resulting matrix, with additional statistical analysis available. The data collection tasks are
relatively simple, the concept is fairly clear, it has the advantages of both attitudinal and
behavior measures, and it offers insights into competition that can benefit marketing strategy.
LOYALTY CONCEPTS AND MEASURES
Perhaps the most cited conceptual definition of brand loyalty comes from Jacoby and
Chestnut (1978, p. SO): "The biased, behavioral response, expressed over time, by some
decision-making unit, with respect to one or more alternative brands out of a set of such
brands, and is a function of psychological (decision-making, evaluative) processes."
Consistent with this definition are two broad categories of operational definitions. The first
stresses the "behavioral response, expressed over time"—typically a series of purchases. (For
example: The purchase pattern, "Coke, Coke, Coke, Pepsi, Coke" suggests higher loyalty
than "Coke, Pepsi, Store brand, Pepsi, Coke.") The advantages of the behavioral measure
include the focus on the most relevant criterion for managers —purchase, the avoidance of
situational effects by measuring over time across several incidents, and the relatively
straightforward nature of the data.
As Day (1969)observed, however, the major limitation of behavioral measures is the failure
to identify motive and the resulting confusion between brand loyalty and other forms of repeat
buying. For example, repeat purchases may result from either low involvement or distribution
limits. Two consumers may regularly purchase morning doughnuts from Jan's bakery. One
does so because he loves Jan's doughnuts; he would drive across town to get them. The other
buys them because he catches the bus outside the bakery. Although he likes doughnuts, he
actually prefers other brands to Jan's, just not enough to go out of his way to buy them.
Clearly, the baker should value the ability to distinguish between these types of consumers.
Purchase behavior alone is insufficient. The major alternative operational definition is based
on consumer attitudes, preferences, and purchase intentions. These measures stress the
cognitive "bias," and the "psychological (decision-making evaluative) processes" underlying
loyalty. Also, because attitudinal measures are typically collected from surveys, they can
more accurately be directed to the "decision-making unit" than can behavioral measures,
which may come from anonymous sales data. Other advantages of attitudinal measures may
include identification of the reasons underlying loyalty and greater protection against the
etTects of temporary conditions, such as stock-outs or short-run competitive promotions. The
limitations of attitudinal measures of loyalty are similar to those of any measure of attitude-
concems for the specificity of the attitude object (particularly attitude toward the brand versus
attitude toward buying the brand), the possibility of demand effects resulting in the
construction of a false attitude (usually from a poorly worded questionnaire), and the
possibility of attitude change (especially since attitude measures are typically one-shot
measures).
In a recent review of the concept, Oliver (1999) proposed four categories of brand loyalty.
The four are based on the classic hierarchy of effects notion that consumers first process
information to form beliefs, use those beliefs as the basis for attitudes, then make behavioral
decisions based on relative attitude strengths. Oliver argues that the value to the firm of
loyalty increases as the basis moves from attribute beliefs, to auitudes, to behavioral
intentions, and, in the fourth category he adds, to a behavior pattern that is strong enough to
resist most obstacles. The additional insight provided by Oliver's framework is valuable, but
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it does not contradict the basic distinction between the attitudinal and behavioral
conceptualizations. He elaborates by proposing two levels of each—relatively weak and
strong attitudes and relatively weak and strong behavioral tendencies. In fact, even the latter
pair, the two strongest forms of loyalty are distinguished essentially by strength of attitude.
What Oliver calls "ultimate loyalty" is driven by behavioral intentions based on very strong
attitudinal preference.
Given the attitude and behavior dimensions of brand loyalty, the business manager has several
options for assessing or monitoring it. Since attitudes are typically fairly stable, inferences
may be drawn from a one-time measure of attitudes, which could be measured in a survey.
Because the behavior dimension requires multiple measures, assessments based on behavior
generally require multiple contacts. (The biases and error inherent in asking subjects to recall
their previous purchases outweigh the benefit of trying to measure several purchases in one
contact.) Three techniques are commonly used to collect data on multiple purchases; Scanner
data can track purchases, but the technology is expensive, and few small businesses are in a
position to use it. A second method is to use a panel whose members record their purchases
over time. The third approach is to conduct a wave of surveys.
The major disadvantage to behavior-based measures of loyalty is the inability to identify the
strength or qualitative nature of the consumer's relationship to the brand. Multiple purchases
may reflect a weak preference based on limited knowledge. Or, no preference but mere habit.
Or, no preference but limited availability of better-liked alternatives. This conceptual
limitation, when coupled with the additional expense of data collection, should impel
managers to include some attitudinal measure in order to qualify brand loyalty. The
preference-behavior model combines simple measures of purchase and preference for an
estimate of brand loyalty that is rich enough to avoid the limitations of using either concept
alone without incurring the additional costs or complexities of many other approaches.
THE PREFERENCE-BEHAVIOR MODEL AND MEASURES
The preference-behavior model is based on a simple change in a brand switching model
developed by Colombo and Morrison (1989). The Colombo and Morrison model was derived
from a classification of consumers as either hard core loyal (HCL) or potential switchers (PS).
Thus, after any given purchase, a consumer will either be sufficiently satisfied that he will
consider no other brands and automatically repurchase the last brand purchased (HCL), or he
will consider alternatives and have some probability of buying each (PS). The simplifying
assumption of the model is that hard core loyals do not switch; potential switchers may or
may not switch. These categories generalize loosely to those consumers who are very brand
loyal and unlikely to switch at a given point and those who are not brand loyal and, therefore,
likely to switch from brand to brand. (See Appendix for details of the Colombo and Morrison
model.)
The proposed preference-behavior model is mathematically equivalent to the simplified
mover-stayer model of Colombo and Morrison (1989). The key change is the substitution of
preference for the first behavior measure. The resulting 2 x 2 matrix consists of "most
preferred brand" and "last brand purchased." The model redefines hard core loyals as those
who always buy their most preferred brand. (Analogs of the consumer who would drive
across town to get his favorite doughnut.) The other consumers are potential switchers. Thus,
the likelihood of purchasing a given brand is the sum of the proportion of that brand's hard
core loyals and some fraction of the remainder. That fraction is a measure of the brand's
ability to attract potential switchers. Thus, the two important parameters of the model reflect
a brand's reliance on highly loyal customers and its success in attracting brand switchers. The
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first group is those who have a positive attitude toward the brand (prefer it) and who buy it.
The second group is those who buy it on a given purchase but who may prefer another brand.
An assumption of the model is that every consumer has a preferred brand. If these consumers
have a preference, why are they "switching?" Although all consumers have a preferred brand,
some preferences are stronger than others. Weak preferences characterize potential switchers.
Potential switchers may be variety seekers; or, they may be responding to sales promotions or
other situational factors. By considering the relative preferences and purchases, the model
computes an ability of each brand to attract consumers from each other brand.
The measures and concepts of the preference-behavior model are illustrated in Table 1. The
diagonal entries represent the number of consumers who last bought the brand they preferred,
which would consist of the hard core loyals and those potential switchers who decided to stay
with the brand one more time. The off-diagonal entries represent those consumers who last
bought something other than their preferred brand.
Table I - Preferred Brand by Last Brand Purchased Matrix
Preferred Brand Last Brand Purchased
Brand I Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4
Brand I X
Brand 2 X
Brand 3 Y X
Brand 4 z X
X: Hard core loyals who bought the brand they preferred.
Y: Switcher who prefers Brand 3 but last bought Brand l.
22 Switcher who prefers Brand 4 but last bought Brand 2.
The preference-behavior model presents some important advantages over the two-behavior
model of Colombo and Morrison (1989) while retaining its principle advantages: (I) It is
based on the same fundamental assumption that the market can be characterized with two
categories —hard core loyals and potential switchers. (2) The output can be easily illustrated
in two dimensions. (3) Data collection, while reduced by Colombo and Morrison (relative to
more extreme time series approaches), is reduced still further. Both preference and last
purchase data can be collected in a single survey. (4) The preference measure, "What is your
favorite brand of " is simple and clear (unlike some multi-item attitude scales). (5) Data
can be collected by mail or telephone.
Further important advantages result from the substitution of preference for a second
behavioral measure. Because it is based on purchase only, a two-purchase model does not
diITerentiate between loyalty and repeat purchase. In the Colombo and Morrison model, the
only requirement for hard core loyal status is two consecutive purchases. In the proposed
model, HCLs state that the brand is their favorite brand and they last purchased it. Also,
because a two-purchase model can be used with panel data, it introduces error that may result
from reports of multiple purchasers. Such error is avoided by the preference-behavior model
because both questions are asked of the household's principle product purchaser.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE AND DISCUSSION
In order to discuss the analytic and normative usefulness of the model, an illustrative case is
presented. These data came from a survey of packaged ice cream consumers and represent
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responses to the preference and last purchase questions covering the leading eight brands of
packaged ice cream in a major metropolitan area (with other brands collapsed). The packaged
ice cream market is an interesting application. The market has had a long history of relative
stability, with strong regional brands and several important but not dominant national brands.
In the late 1990s, two major national brands, Breyers and Dreyers, were purchased in part by
companies that planned on aggressive marketing strategies aimed at developing positions of
national prominence if not dominance. Independent regional brands with premium positions
and limited marketing budgets have had to pay close attention to maintaining their loyalty and
to specific competitive comparisons to determine if their past strategies could withstand an
influx of marketing muscle. The brands that were included in this study, with some relevant
description are presented in Table 2. (Some brand names have been disguised.)
Table 2 - Packaged lce Cream Brands
BRAND POSITION DISTRIBUTION PRICE
Haagen Dazs super premium national high
Ben /k Jerry's super premium national high
Stove rs premium regional medium
Dreyers premium national medium
Richards premium regional high
Neers premium regional medium
8reyers premium national medium
Smiths regular regional low
Other mostly regular regional low/medium
Respondents werc 180 people randomly selected by a professional marketing research
company, pre-screened for packaged ice cream consumption and identification of the
principal ice cream purchaser in the household. The 10-minute phone survey was an image
analysis sponsored by one of the firms; it covered attitudes, knowledge, and use of ice cream.
Thc data were responses to two specific questions, "What is your favorite brand of packaged
ice cream?" and "What is the brand of packaged ice cream you purchased last?" which
appeared in separate parts of the survey. Results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 - Preferred Brand by Last Purchased Brand
LAST PURCHASED BRAND
Preferred
HD LJ St Dr Ri Ne Br Sm Other Total
Haagen Dazs 5 I 0 0 I 2 2 2 12 25
Bends Jerry's I 16 I 0 2 0 0 4 7 31
Stovers 0 0 9 I 0 0 I I 9 21
Dreyers 0 0 I 5 0 0 2 0 2 10
Richards I I 3 3 23 3 0 10 12 56
Neers 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 4 10
Breyers 0 I 0 0 I 0 7 I 2 12
Smiths 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 12 2 15
Total 7 19 16 9 28 9 12 30 50 180
The right hand column of Table 3 indicates the number of respondents who identified each of
the eight brands as the preferred brand —25 for Haagen Dazs, 31 for Ben/k Jerry's, etc.. The
eight brands had been identified by management as the set of close competitors. The columns
of Table 3 indicate the last purchased brand for each preferred brand. For example, of the 25
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who identified Haagen Dazs as their favorite brand, only 5 had last purchased Haagen Dazs, I
had purchased Ben & Jerry's, and so on, with 12 having most recently purchased a brand from
the "other" category. The diagonal entries in the table indicate consumers who last purchased
their preferred brands.
The data in Table 3 can provide considerable insight into the competition of the market. The
preference measures indicate perceptions of brand quality or brand equity. Alone, they may
not be good indicators of competitive strength, because they fail to capture some aspects of
value —particularly price and availability. Just as a positive attitude toward Rolls Royce may
not predict purchase of a Rolls, a preference for Haagen Dazs, by itself, may not identify a
Haagen Dazs consumer. Nonetheless, a brand with strong consumer preference has a
competitive advantage. In this case, Richards had about 31%of the expressed preferences for
the set of eight brands (56/180, from the far right column) and was, in fact, the region's
leading selling brand. On the other hand, the second leading selling brand of the eight was
Smiths, which had only an 8% share of preference (15/180). This simple result indicates that
Smiths must have something else going for it, and, indeed, Smiths was by far the most
3
aggressive price-promoting brand in the region.
Another insight into the loyalty of consumers comes from an examination of the diagonals.
The diagonal entries are the number of consumers who last bought their preferred brands. If
we compare those to the total number of consumers who preferred the brand, we get the
proportion of the preferences that were converted into sales. For Haagen Dazs, this
proportion is .20—5 preferred and bought (on the diagonal) versus 25 total preferred (from the
right-most column). This proportion is termed gravity —the power of the brand to maintain
consumers who prefer it. A brand with high gravity has consumers who are very loyal to their
favorite brand. For these eight brands, the gravity proportions all fall within a range of .40 to
.58 except for one very low score, Haagen Dazs (.20) and one high, Smiths (.80). Thus,
Haagen Dazs was able to convert only 20% of its preferred customers into sales; whereas,
Smiths converted a full 80%.
Brand preference is built up over time, based on fairly stable attitudes, but preference alone
does not reflect reactions to price or to temporary promotions or stock-outs. A high gravity
ratio, however, indicates that consumers regard the brand as desirable, available, and a good
value, a brand that is relatively resistant to competitive prices or promotions. These data
suggest that Haagen Dazs had established preference but may have been priced too high or
distributed too selectively to convert those preferences to sales. Smiths had much lower
preference but did more with what it had.
A different perspective on the market is revealed by comparing the diagonals with the total of
last purchased. This ratio represents the proportion of sales that come from consumers who
identify the brand as most preferred and is termed focus. For example, Haagen Dazs has a
focus of .71—5 preferred and bought (on the diagonal) versus 7 total purchased (from the
bottom row). A brand with high focus gets sales mostly from consumers who prefer it.
Brands with low focus "steal" customers from other brands. Of the eight brands, the two with
highest focus ratios were Ben & Jerry's (.84) and Richards (.82). The other brands range
around .60, except Smiths, with sales to its own first preference consumers of only .40.
Firms can succeed with either high or low focus. These data suggest that Ben & Jerry's and
Richards were succeeding by leveraging strong loyalty (high focus); whereas, Smiths relied
on the ability to attract consumers who preferred other brands, capturing deal-prone
consumers and brand switchers. This interpretation is consistent with the observation that
Smiths was the most active price promoter and that Ben & Jerry's and Richards were among
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the highest priced and least frequently promoted. (Gravity and Focus ratios for the eight
brands are presented in Table 4.)
Table 4 - Gravity and Focus Ratios
Brand Gravity Focus
Haagen Dazs .20 .71
Ben & Jerry's .52 .84
Stovers .43 .56
Dreyers .50 .56
Richards .41 .82
Neers .40 .44
Breyers .58 .58
Smiths .80 .40
Inter-brand competition and threats to loyalty can be analyzed by examining the individual
off-diagonal entries. Each off-diagonal represents the number of consumers who preferred
one brand but purchased another. (In this case, sample size makes inferences somewhat risky,
but the data still serve as an illustration of the usefulness of the method.) These results
suggest, for example, that both Ben & Jerry's and Richards are threatened by Smiths. Smiths
has stolen 4 of Ben & Jerry's 31 and 10 of Richards 56 preference customers. These ratios
(5/31 and 10/56) are indicators of the weakness of these two brands to Smiths. Smiths, in
turn, can consider those sales relative to their own total as instances of competitor-specific
focus. Smiths gets 13% (4/30) of its sales from people who prefer Ben & Jerry's and 33%
(10/30) from people who prefer Richards. (Note that Smiths own brand focus is only .40.)
For another example, consider the off-diagonal for Neers and "other." Neers is losing as
many of its loyal customers to the set of "other" brands (4) as it is keeping for itself, which
suggests both that it is perceived as a low-end entry and that it competes only peripherally
with the other seven brands in this group.
A limitation of the analysis of the preference-behavior matrix in most cases will be the uneven
sales levels across brands. To overcome that problem and to examine loyalty from a slightly
different perspective, maximum likelihood estimations of the parameters of the Colombo and
Morrison (1989) equations can be calculated. (The results for the illustrative case are in the
Appendix.
The modest attractive powers of Breyers and Dreyers deserve comment. These data were
collected just before those brands were purchased. In the following year, the marketing
budgets and strategies of those brands changed dramatically. A subsequent round of data
collection would likely reveal increased ability of those brands to attract brand switchers. The
key for regional brand managers is whether they will be able to continue success through their
strategies based on low focus (Smiths), gravity (Stovers), or both (Richards), given the
increased pressure from the national brands.
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
The purpose of this paper was to propose a new and improved method for examining brand
loyalty. A major benefit of the proposed model is its simplicity. It requires two direct
questions of consumers, regarding preferred brand and last purchase. These questions could
be added to virtually any planned research study or could be the focus of an independent study
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that most firms could undertake at far less cost than the more elaborate data collection
methods required for alternative methods (panel studies, multiple surveys, or single source
time series).
Further, the method assures distinction between loyalty and mere repeat purchase by inclusion
of the preference measure. And, it reduces error by addressing the decision maker rather than
relying on household sales reports.
Using the preference-behavior model is both easy and inexpensive. The bulk of the
interpretation can be done by analyzing the preference-behavior matrix, which does not
require any statistical analysis and can be done with any basic spreadsheet sofbvare. The key
indicators are the gravity and focus ratios, calculated from proportions of the diagonals to row
and column totals. Specific inter-brand competitions can be analyzed by examining the
appropriate off-diagonals —a firm could identify its most direct competitors as those with the
highest firm-specific focus scores. Ideally, these analyses would be conducted over time,
so that firms could track their performances 'on the relevant dimensions in light of changes in
marketing strategy. But, in any respect, the interpretation of the data from this method is
neither complex nor cumbersome. The additional analyses required for the parameter
estimations, of course, do require quantitative skill. But, these estimations are not necessary
for interpretation of the data. Thus, small business owners or marketing managers who do not
have the support of marketing research staff may still make use of the tool. The parameter
estimations are, nonetheless, useful and important because they make possible both statistical
tests and simple standardized values for comparison purposes.
For most small businesses, the cost of doing marketing research is a significant impediment.
A major advantage of this method is that the costs are minimal. In fact, the marginal costs
may be virtually zero. The data presented here were collected as part of a brand repositioning
study that focused on a change in packaging. The preference and purchase measures were
two of the thirty or so items in a telephone questionnaire. Any firm could include these
measures in any study aimed at satisfaction monitoring or brand attitudes, which small
business would be wise to conduct periodically. A true guerrilla marketer might even bargain
to have the relevant questions included on some other questionnaire conducted by a local
research firm.
The preference-behavior model has important implications for small business strategy.
Gravity can be thought of as a measure of general marketing efficiency —the ability of a firm
to convert preference to sales. If a firm is doing enough (usually through its offering) to
establish preference, its marketing (usually the other 3 Ps—pricing, distribution, and
promotion) must be able to capitalize on that basic advantage. Although a high gravity ratio is
not a requirement for success (since widespread preference will lower it), firms should
constantly attempt to increase it. For example, consider a local restaurant that conducted a
simple study as part of an effort to increase profitability. The owner was looking for ways to
increase the store's appeal. What he discovered was that most potential customers already
preferred him. But, his gravity ratio was very low. The problem, he learned, was his pricing,
which was perceived as too high. By lowering his prices, he converted many of those
preferences to sales and increased his overall profitability.
The focus ratio tends to reflect targeting. A high focus score indicates a firm that is relying on
sales to customers who prefer it. It results from a successful targeting strategy that produces a
group of loyal consumers who buy what they most want. Conversely, a low focus score
indicates that the firm is relying on sales to customers who prefer some other brand, which
corresponds to an unfocused strategy. (One might suggest that the focus could be on brand
switchers, but that group is both ill-defined and, for a given brand, by definition, constantly
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changing.) The clearest strategy for attracting consumers away from other brands is through
regular sales promotions. Price cuts offer enough economic incentive to offset the additional
value of competitive brands. Few small businesses, however, enjoy the cost advantages
necessary to support such a strategy. Typically, only large firms enjoy the economies of scale
that make cost-based strategies feasible. It should be noted, however, that frequent price
promotion may also be a desperation strategy for failing or marginal brands. Thus, for most
small businesses, a low focus score is not likely an objective. They should aim for a high
focus score; such a strategy would conserve resources and simplify management.
For example, consider a tutoring firm, TestSuccess. After three years, with three locations,
TestSuccess was merely limping along. Analysis of their strategy suggested that their focus
ratio was too low. Their advertising in newspaper and on radio, which was a major expense,
was creating awareness and preference among students all over the region. But, students in
only about 20% of the area had reasonable access to one of the locations. TestSuccess
changed to a more targeted promotion campaign, emphasizing referrals and focusing on
schools near their locations. They expect a lower level of preference but a higher focus, lower
expenses, and more profit.
Gravity and focus scores broadly reflect whether firms compete by focusing on their target
segments (high gravity) or by appealing loosely to several segments or to frequent switchers
(low focus). Generally, firms will invest relatively more in brand strengthening actions (e.g.,
quality improvements or image advertising) and more targeted marketing to increase or
maintain high gravity. Conversely, firms will invest relatively more in sales promotions and
broader marketing to reduce or maintain a low focus.
An interesting application of the model might be to assess the proportion of hard-core loyals
versus potential switchers before a firm enters the market. Markets with more potential
switchers may be more attractive and involve less head-to-head competition with established
firms.
A final implication of the model comes from a consideration of the off-diagonal entries.
These entries indicate specific firm-to-firm competition. Managers should identify
weaknesses —firms to whom they lose their own preference customers —and strengths —sales
they steal (customers with preference for other brands). Relatively high scores indicate
specific firms that are potential threats or targets, and management should determine the basis
for the competition and act upon it. Often, this means matching competitive promotions or
using comparative advertising —"More people who prefer Brand X buy our brand, because we
taste just as good AND we cost less!"
Although there are significant advantages to the preference-behavior approach to assessing
brand loyalty, the method is not without its limitations. Because it is likely to rely on survey
methods for data collection, it shares the usual limits and concerns about sample size, sample
representativeness, and questionnaire design, but other limitations and questions relate more
directly to the specific conceptualization of brand loyalty. These include the stability of the
statistics, the nature and meaning of the preference measure, and the meaning of the loyalty
operationalization.
Estimation stability is a question with any model. The issues are the stability of the two
factors —preference and purchase and the reliability of the their measures. Since preference is
an attitudinal construct, we should expect it to be more stable than any specific behavior,
which may be responsive to situational pressures. In this respect, we should expect the
preference-behavior model to exhibit better stability than models based solely on purchases.
As has been argued throughout, purchases will vary more than preferences.
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The measures themselves should be highly reliable. They are unambiguous and have the
advantage of being directed at the specific individual in the household who most typically
purchases the product. Thus, just as with models based solely on purchases, the estimates will
change over time if consumers switch brands, but their inherent instability should be less.
Anchoring loyalty in preference should also increase the validity of the estimates. Consider,
for example, a consumer who prefers brand A with the following four-time purchase pattern:
A, A, B, A. A repeat purchase approach to loyalty will characterize this consumer as loyal to
brand A only one time in three (A-A versus A-B and B-A). By contrast, the preference-
behavior approach would not only identify the preference component correctly all four times,
but would show an A-A correspondence three times out of four. Further, the preference-
behavior approach distinguishes loyalty based on brand equity from loyalty based on habit or
situational inducements. If a consumer buys brand B only because brand A is not available,
the model will categorize him appropriately and not mistake him for a brand 8 HCL.
One remaining question is the potential bias of last purchase on stated preference. If
respondents feel some social desirability pressure toward consistency, they might indicate that
their preferred brand was the brand last purchased. Such a bias would inflate the estimates of
HCL and gravity. The competitive insights drawn from the results should not be affected,
however, since any bias is unlikely to aIYect brands differentially'. Nonetheless, two cautions
might be taken. First, as was done in the current illustrative case, the preference question
should be asked first, and the two questions should be separated in the questionnaire.
(Although respondents could "lie" about their last purchases in order to appear consistent, to
do so is much less likely than "fudging" on their preferences.) Second, the preference
question can be designed to reduce bias. For example, the question might be "Although
people may not always buy their favorite brands, most people do have a favorite brand.
Which brand is your favorite?" A related possible source of bias is that respondents who do
not have a strong preference may report their last purchase as their favorite. Although it is not
altogether clear that such an instance constitutes a true bias, its effect could be mitigated by
screening subjects with a question such as?Do you have a favorite brand?" and excluding
those who do not.
In general, the advantages of the preference-behavior approach outweigh the limitations.
Most of its limitations are inherent in any survey methodology. On the other hand, its
advantages of low cost, ease and speed of data collection, ease of interpretation, and insight
into the nature of brand loyalty and competition should make it a useful tool for small
business managers. By collecting the appropriate data and examining the outputs of the
preference-behavior model, small business managers can assess their progress toward the
relevant aspects of their chosen strategies —extend of preference, success in converting
preference, reliance on preference customers, and success in attracting customers who prefer
competitors. A final note: Managers should be encouraged not only to use this tool, but to use
it repeatedly. The best use of the preference-behavior model is probably monitoring changes
in the marketplace over time, both to evaluate the firm's marketing and as a way to keep
current on the marketplace.
ENDNOTES
The discussion in this paper draws principally from brand loyalty research, but the concepts
and implications generalize to store loyalty and firm loyalty. Thus, the term "customer
loyalty" refers generally to loyalty to any of those levels.
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'I am indebted in this discussion to an excellent review of brand loyalty measures, Mellens,
Dekimpe, and Steenkamp (1996).
'Note that the purchase proportions from these data do not necessarily reflect actual market
shares, since the data were limited to respondents who indicated one of the eight brands of
interest as the preferred brand. They should, and do, reflect relative sales levels. In the
sample, Smiths had a .17 share (30/180) and Richards a .16 share (28/180). In actual market
shares, Smiths trailed Richards slightly.
'Estimates of brand loyalty for the brands were not available beyond one brand manager'
estimate of "at least 50%". Alsop (1989)reported measures of brand loyalty for a number of
products, excluding, unfortunately, ice cream. Because of the strong images of brands and
because the category is not characterized by constant and heavy sales promotion, we should
expect to see brand loyalty higher than for canned tuna (44%), soft drinks (44%), or beer
(48%); probably closer to the 58% level observed for coffee.
'The data in the illustrative case cannot offer a formal test of this potential bias, but they do
not appear to exhibit it. There is not a close association between preference and last purchase.
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APPENDIX: DETAILS OF THE COLOMBO AND MORRISON MODEL.
Given a 2 x 2 matrix of purchases, Colombo and Morrison estimated a model based on two
equations:
1) pa= a,+(I-ct,) n;
2) pe=(l-a,) n,
where p„was the probability of repurchase, pu was the probability of switching from brand i
to brand j, a, was the proportion of hard core loyals for brand i, and x; is the proportion of
potential switchers who next buy brand i. Thus, the probability of buying brand i was
decomposed into the proportion of hard core loyals who were loyal to brand i and brand i'
share of the potential switchers. Switchers from brand i to a given brand, j, resulted from the
proportion who were not loyal to brand i in proportion to brand j's ability to convert potential
switchers. (Details are available in Colombo and Morrison 1989). Colombo and Morrison
provided an analysis of a sw'itching matrix for new cars and illustrated the effectiveness of
their model for identifying the success or failure of marketing strategies not only in
maintaining loyal customers but also in converting potential switchers and, further, which
switchers are vulnerable to which brands.
The Colombo and Morrison parameters were estimated for the ice cream case and are
presented in Table 5. The parameter estimates, a, and n;, are direct estimates of the extent of
hard core loyalty and ability to attract potential switchers. (Recall that cq is the likelihood of a
brand's retaining customers who prefer that brand and x; is the likelihood of attracting
customers who prefer other brands.) These estimates are similar to but not the same as the
gravity and focus ratios defined above. Gravity is the proportion of preferred sales that are
converted to sales. Preferred sales can be decomposed into those who will always buy that
brand (HCLs) and those who prefer the brand but might have switched (PSs). Thus, a brand
could have high gravity because of inherently high hard core loyalty or because it does a good
job of keeping those potential switchers who like it best. The distinction maybe subtle, but it
is important; HCLs are more valuable to a firm than retained PSs. A comparison of the
gravity ratios from Table 4 and the eq scores from Table 5 shows that the two are in fairly
close agreement in this case, but the levels of HCLs show less range. Although Haagen Dazs
converts only 20% of its preferences to sales, relative to Smiths 80%, the differences in HCL
are less extreme (.357 versus .885).
Table 5 - Parameter Estimates for Ice Cream Brands
Brand ah ttl
Haagen Dazs .357 .042
Ben & Jerry's .644 .064
Stovers .711 .134
Dreyers .594 .076
Richards .430 .163
Neers .632 .093
Breyers .668 095
Smiths .885 .417
eq is the estimate of the proportion of buyers of brand i who are hard core loyals.
x; is the estimate of the proportion of potential switchers that will switch to brand i.
'The x, figures sum to over 1.0 due to errors in the estimates.
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For focus and nu the PS indicator, the differences are more significant. Focus is the
proportion of a brand's sales that come from its own preferences. Thus, I-focus is the
proportion of a brand's sales that came from preferences for other brands. The PS indicator,
nu is a measure of the power of a brand to attract other-brand preferences. Thus, I-focus is an
indicator of eITect; whereas, n; is an indicator of cause. The difference is clearly sensitive to
sales volume. Note that Richards has a relatively low I-focus score (.18,which is the second
lowest), but its ability to attract potential switchers is relatively high, as indicated by its it, of
.163, which is the second highest. Because Richards is the leading selling brand, its strong
attractive force still results in only a small proportion of its total sales.
The results in Table 5 afford several other specific insights into competition. First, the
parameter estimates indicate both a high proportion of HCLs (.885) and strong attraction to
other-brand preferences (.417) for Smiths. Bear in mind that Smiths begins with a small
number of first preference consumers, so the high oq does not result in so many sales. Its sales
volume comes from its ability to attract customers away from other brands. Smiths succeeds
with a strategy of aggressive price promotions supported by newspaper advertising and retail
displays. Stovers, on the other hand, has moderately good attractive power (n; =.134) but
excellent HCL (a, =.711),which suggests that it succeeds in keeping its own loyal customers.
In fact, Stovers had modest sales in the region but a strong niche based on freshness. That
distinction may be important to the customers who prefer it; important enough to maintain
loyalty. Next, Richards, the leading selling brand of this group, has moderate HCL but strong
attractive power (.163). The significance of Richards's attractive power is evident by
comparison. Generally, the higher rqs are held by brands with lower prices or more frequent
promotions. The high-end brands, Haagen Dazs and Ben & Jerry's, have the two lowest tt,s.
Richards has the second highest despite its high-end price. A final noteworthy observation is
the tenuous position of Haagen Dazs, which has by far the lowest parameter estimates in
Table 5. Despite its position as a national brand and its presumed high quality perception,
Haagen Dazs is neither maintaining the customers who prefer it, nor successful in stealing
customers from other brands.
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